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Abstract
It has long been recognized that there is considerable heterogeneity in
individual risk taking behavior but little is known about the distribution
of risk taking types. We present a parsimonious characterization of risk
taking behavior by estimating a finite mixture regression model for three
different experimental data sets, two Swiss and one Chinese, over a large
number of real gains and losses. We find two distinct types of individuals:
In all three data sets, the choices of roughly 80% of the subjects exhibit
significant deviations from linear probability weighting, consistent with
prospect theory. 20% of the subjects weight probabilities near linearly
and behave essentially as expected value maximizers. Moreover, individ-
uals are cleanly assigned to one type with probabilities close to unity.
The reliability and robustness of our classification suggest using a mix of
preference theories in applied economic modeling.
KEYWORDS: Individual Risk Taking Behavior, Latent Heterogeneity,
Finite Mixture Regression Models, Prospect Theory
JEL CLASSIFICATION: D81, C49
1 Introduction
Risk is a ubiquitous feature of social and economic life. Many of our every-
day choices, and often the most important ones, such as what trade to learn
and where to live, involve risky consequences. While it has long been recog-
nized that individuals differ in their risk taking attitudes, comparatively little
is known about the distribution of risk preferences in the population.1 Since
preferences are one of the ultimate drivers of behavior, knowledge of the compo-
sition of risk attitudes is paramount to predicting economic behavior. Economic
models often allow for heterogeneity, but this heterogeneity is usually defined
by the boundaries of the standard model of preferences, expected utility theory
(EUT). The empirical evidence, however, reveals that heterogeneity in risk tak-
ing behavior is of a substantive kind, i.e. some people evaluate risky prospects
consistently with EUT, whereas other people depart substantially from expected
utility maximization (Hey and Orme, 1994). Moreover, it seems to be the case
that rational decision makers revealing EUT-preferences constitute only a mi-
nority of the population (Lattimore, Baker, and Witte, 1992).
To improve descriptive performance a plethora of alternative theories have
been developed. Unfortunately, no single best fitting model has been identified
so far (Harless and Camerer, 1994; Starmer, 2000) and, depending on the indi-
vidual, one or the other model fits better. This finding poses a serious problem
for applied economics. What the modeler needs is a parsimonious representa-
tion of risk preferences that is empirically well grounded and robust, and not a
host of different functionals. Providing such a parsimonious characterization of
heterogeneity in risk taking behavior is the objective of this paper.
Our method is based on a literature on classifying individuals which has
recently emerged in the social sciences. On the basis of statistical classification
1Exceptions include Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner (2005); Eckel,
Johnson, and Montmarquette (2005); Harrison, Lau, and Rutstro¨m (2007).
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procedures, such as finite mixture regression models, investigators have tried
to discover which decision rules people actually apply when playing games or
dealing with complex decision situations (El-Gamal and Grether, 1995; Stahl
and Wilson, 1995; Houser, Keane, and McCabe, 2004; Houser and Winter, 2004).
The finite mixture regression approach does not require fitting a model for
each individual, which is - given the usual quality of choice data - frequently
impossible. Instead, our method reveals latent heterogeneity by estimating
the proportions of distinct behavioral types in the population and assigning
each individual to one endogenously defined behavioral type, characterized by
a unique set of parameter values.
We apply such a finite mixture regression model to choice data from three
different experiments, two of which were conducted in Zurich, Switzerland. The
third experiment took place in Beijing, People’s Republic of China. We analyze
448 subjects’ decisions over real monetary gains and losses, which comprise a
total of nearly 18,000 observations. All three experiments were designed in a
similar manner and served to elicit certainty equivalents for binary lotteries.
Using a flexible sign-dependent functional as basic behavioral model, we show
the following main results for two- and three-component mixture models.
First, the estimation procedure renders a robust classification of risk taking
behavior across all three data sets. Moreover, the proportions of these distinct
types in their respective populations are very similar.
Second, almost all the experimental subjects are unambiguously assigned
to one distinct type. Measuring the quality of classification by the Normalized
Entropy Criterion (Celeux and Soromenho, 1996), ambiguity of assignments
turns out to be extremely low. Thus, we observe hardly any “ambiguous” types,
i.e. individuals with a high probability (of say 0.4) of being one type and a high
probability (of say 0.6) of being another type. This clean segregation suggests
that the classification procedure is able to capture the distinctive characteristics
of each behavioral type.
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Third, without restricting parameter values a priori, we find that, in all
three data sets the minority types, who constitute about 20% of the population,
weight probabilities and value monetary outcomes near linearly. Consequently,
this group of individuals can essentially be characterized as expected value max-
imizers. This result is particularly interesting in the light of Rabin’s calibration
theorem (Rabin, 2000), which shows that expected utility maximizers should be
approximately risk neutral for small stakes typically encountered in laboratory
experiments if behavior under high stakes is to remain within a plausible range
of risk aversion. Therefore, we label subjects belonging to this group of nearly
risk neutral people as “EUT types”. Moreover, the EUT group remains totally
robust to increasing the number of types in the mixture.
Fourth, the majority of individuals, labeled as “CPT types”, are charac-
terized by significant departures from linear probability weighting, consistent
with prospect theory. As three-group classifications show, this group’s behavior
can be characterized as a mixture of two different types: In all three data sets a
proportion of approximately 30% of the subjects display pronounced departures
from linear probability weighting, whereas the relative majority of 50% differ
less radically from linear probability weighting.
Finally, within the class of CPT types, we find major differences between
Swiss and Chinese behavior. Sensitivity to changes in probabilities is gener-
ally lower for the Chinese subjects than for the Swiss. While in both countries
the majority CPT groups’ probability weighting curves do not differ dramati-
cally, the minority groups display diametrically opposed patterns of probability
weighting. In particular, the minority Chinese CPT group weight probabili-
ties extremely favorably rendering them risk seeking over a considerable range
of probabilities. The minority Swiss CPT group, however, is characterized by
the opposite behavior. Thus, our analysis provides a deeper understanding for
the finding that, on average, the Chinese tend to be more risk seeking than
Westerners (Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992).
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Our results show that the classification procedure successfully uncovers la-
tent heterogeneity in the population. If there is heterogeneity of a substantive
kind, as the data suggest, basing predictions on a single preference theory is
inappropriate and may lead to biased results. EUT preferences should be taken
account of alongside prospect theory preferences, even if rational EUT individu-
als constitute only a minority in the population. As the literature on the role of
bounded rationality under strategic complementarity and substitutability has
shown (Haltiwanger and Waldman, 1985, 1989; Fehr and Tyran, 2005; Camerer
and Fehr, 2006), the mix of rational and irrational actors may be decisive for
aggregate outcomes. Depending on the nature of the strategic interdependence
the behavior of even a minority of players may drive the aggregate outcome.
Therefore, the mix of types in the population is a crucial variable in predicting
market outcomes. Since the finite mixture regressions provide a robust and
reliable classification of individuals, the resulting estimates of group sizes and
group-specific parameters may serve as valuable inputs for applied economics.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no previous study showing a nearly
identical classification of risk preference types for three independent data sets.
Related work by Harrison and colleagues (Harrison and Rutstro¨m, forthcoming;
Harrison, Humphrey, and Verschoor, 2005; Andersen, Harrison, and Rutstro¨m,
2006) estimated risk taking behavior by finite mixture regressions, but decisively
distinguishes itself from our analysis. Their estimation procedure is based on
the a priori assumption that choices, irrespective by whom they were taken,
may be EUT consistent or CPT consistent, i.e. it sorts choices by pre-defined
decision model. In contrast, we aim at classifying individuals by endogenously
defined type. Therefore, if there is a group of people whose behavior can best
be described by EUT they should get identified by the classification procedure.
Furthermore, in certain decision situations the behaviors of EUT individuals
and CPT individuals do not differ substantially from one other. Consequently,
the classification of EUT- and CPT-consistent decisions differs markedly from
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the percentages of decision makers classified as being one or the other type.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental
design and procedures of the three experiments. The functional specification of
the behavioral model and the finite mixture regression model are discussed in
Section 3. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics of the data and the results
of the classification procedure. Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
In the following section we describe the experimental setup and procedures. The
experiments took place in Zurich in 2003 and 2006 as well as in Beijing in 2005.
In Zurich, all subjects were recruited from the subject pool of the Institute for
Empirical Research in Economics, which consists of students of all fields of the
University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich. In
Beijing, subjects were recruited by flier distributed at the campuses of Peking
University and Tsinhua University. Since all three experiments are based on the
same design principles, we will present the prototype experiment Zurich 2003
in detail and describe to what extent the other two experiments deviate from
the prototype. The main distinguishing features of the different experiments
are summarized in Table 1.
We elicited certainty equivalents for a large number of two-outcome lotter-
ies. One half of the lotteries were framed as choices between risky and certain
gains (“gain domain”), the other half were presented as choices between risky
and certain losses (“loss domain”). For each decision in the loss domain, sub-
jects were endowed with a specific monetary amount, which served to cover
potential losses and equalized expected payoffs of corresponding gain and loss
lotteries. In the Zurich 2003 and the Beijing experiments, 50% of the subjects
were confronted with decisions framed in the standard gamble format. The
other 50% of the subjects had to make choices framed in contextual terms, i.e.
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Table 1: Differences in Experimental Design
Zurich 03 Zurich 06 Beijing 05
Number of:
Subjects 179 118 151
Lotteries 50 40 28
Observations 8,906 4,669 4,225
Procedure computerized computerized paper and pencil
Framing abstract and contextual abstract and
contextual contextual
gains were represented as risky or sure investment gains, losses as repair costs
and insurance premiums, respectively. The Zurich 2006 experiment was based
on contextually framed lotteries only. In Zurich, outcomes x1 and x2 ranged
from zero Swiss Francs to 150 Swiss Francs2. The payoffs in the Beijing 2005
experiment were commensurate with the compensation in Zurich and varied
between 4 and 55 Chinese Yuan3. Expected payoffs per subject amounted to
approximately 31 Swiss Francs and 20 Chinese Yuan, respectively, which was
considerably more than a local student assistant’s hourly compensation, plus a
show up fee of 10 Swiss Francs and 20 Chinese Yuan, thus generating salient
incentives. Probabilities p of the lotteries’ higher gain or loss x1 varied from 5%
to 95%. The gain lotteries for Zurich 2003 are presented in Table 2. The other
two experiments essentially included a subset of these. The lotteries appeared
in random order on a computer screen4, in Beijing on paper.
2At the time of the experiments, one Swiss Franc equaled about 0.76 and 0.84 U.S. Dollars,
respectively.
3At the time of the experiment, one Chinese Yuan equaled about 0.12 U.S. Dollars.
4The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007).
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Table 2: Gain Lotteries (x1, p;x2), Zurich 2003
p x1 x2 p x1 x2 p x1 x2
0.05 20 0 0.25 50 20 0.75 50 20
0.05 40 10 0.50 10 0 0.90 10 0
0.05 50 20 0.50 20 10 0.90 20 10
0.05 150 50 0.50 40 10 0.90 50 0
0.10 10 0 0.50 50 0 0.95 20 0
0.10 20 10 0.50 50 20 0.95 40 10
0.10 50 0 0.50 150 0 0.95 50 20
0.25 20 0 0.75 20 0
0.25 40 10 0.75 40 10
Outcomes x1 and x2 are denominated in Swiss Francs (CHF).
Figure 1: Design of the Decision Sheet
Decision situation:
22
Guaranteed payoff amounting to:
1 A o B
2 A o B
3 A o B
4 A o B
5 A o B
6 A o B
7 A o B
8 A o B
9 A o B
10 A o B
11 A o B
12 A o B
13 A o B
14 A o B
15 A o B
16 A o B
17 A o B
18 A o B
19 A o B
20 A o B 1
15
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13
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OK
20
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Option B
7
6
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4
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2
Option A Your Choice:
A profit of CHF 20 with 
probability 75%             
and a profit of CHF 0 with 
probability 25% 
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In the computerized experiments, the screen displayed a decision sheet con-
taining the specifics of the lottery under consideration and a list of 20 equally
spaced certain outcomes, ranging from the lottery’s maximum payoff to the lot-
tery’s minimum payoff, as shown in Figure 1.5 The subjects had to indicate
whether they preferred the lottery or the certain payoff for each row of the de-
cision sheet. The lottery’s certainty equivalent was calculated as the arithmetic
mean of the smallest certain amount the subject preferred to the lottery and the
subsequent certain amount on the list, when the subject had, for the first time,
reported preference for the lottery. For example, if the subject had decided as
indicated by the small circles in Figure 1, her certainty equivalent would amount
to 13.5 Swiss Francs.
Before subjects were permitted to start working on the real decisions, they
had to correctly calculate the payoffs for two hypothetical choices. In the com-
puterized experiments, there were two trial rounds to familiarize the subjects
with the procedure. At the end of the experiment, one row number of one de-
cision sheet was randomly selected for each subject, and the subject’s choice
in that row determined her payment. Subjects were paid in private afterward.
The subjects could work at their own speed, the vast majority of them needed
less than an hour to complete the experimental tasks as well as a socio-economic
questionnaire.
3 Econometric Model
This section discusses the specification of the finite mixture regression model,
which allows controlling for latent heterogeneity in risk taking behavior in a
parsimonious way. For the purpose of classifying subjects according to risk
taking type, we need to specify three ingredients of the mixture model: the
5The format of the decision sheet for the Beijing experiment was identical to the Zurich
one.
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basic theory of decision under risk, the functional form of the decision model,
and the specification of the error term.
The underlying theory of decision under risk should be able to accommodate
a wide range of different behaviors. Sign- and rank-dependent models, such as
cumulative prospect theory (CPT), capture reference dependence and nonlinear
probability weighting. Therefore, a flexible approach, such as proposed by CPT,
lends itself to describing risk taking behavior. Moreover, CPT nests EUT as
special case. If there is a group of people, whose behavior can best be described
by EUT, these individuals should be identified by the finite mixture regression
as a unique group exhibiting the predicted behavior.
Suppose that there are C different types of individuals in the population.
According to CPT, an individual belonging to a certain group c ∈ {1, . . . , C}
values any binary gamble Gg = (x1g, pg;x2g), g ∈ {1, . . . , G}, where |x1g| > |x2g|,
by
v (Gg) = v(x1g)w(pg) + v(x2g)(1− w(pg)).
The function v(x) describes how monetary outcomes x are valued, whereas the
function w(p) assigns a subjective weight to every outcome probability p. The
gamble’s certainty equivalent cˆeg can then be written as
cˆeg = v
−1 [v(x1g)w(pg) + v(x2g)(1− w(pg))] .
In order to make CPT operational, we have to assume specific functional
forms for the value function v(x) and the probability weighting function w(p).
A natural candidate for v(x) is a sign-dependent power functional
v(x) =
 xα if x ≥ 0−(−x)β otherwise,
which can be conveniently interpreted and has turned out to be the best com-
promise between parsimony and goodness of fit in the context of prospect theory
9
(Stott, 2006).6
A variety of functional forms for modeling probability weights w(p) have
been proposed in the literature (Quiggin, 1982; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992;
Prelec, 1998). We use the two-parameter specification suggested by Goldstein
and Einhorn (1987) and Lattimore, Baker, and Witte (1992):
w(p) =
δpγ
δpγ + (1− p)γ , δ ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0.
We favor this specification because it has proven to account well for individual
heterogeneity (Wu, Zhang, and Gonzalez, 2004) and the parameters are nicely
interpretable. The parameter γ largely governs the slope of the curve and
measures sensitivity towards changes in probability. The smaller the value of
γ, the more strongly the probability weighting function departs from linear
weighting. The parameter δ largely governs curve elevation and measures the
relative degree of optimism. The larger the value of δ for gains, the more
elevated is the curve, the higher is the weight placed on every probability and,
consequently, the more optimistically the prospect is valued, ceteris paribus.
For losses, the opposite holds. Linear weighting is characterized by γ = δ = 1.
In a sign-dependent model, the parameters may take on different values for
gains and for losses.
We now turn to the third step of model specification. In the course of the
experiments, we measured risk taking behavior of individual i ∈ {1, . . . , N} by
her certainty equivalents ceig for a set of different lotteries. Since CPT explains
deterministic choice, we have to add an error term ig in order to estimate
the parameters of the model based on the elicited certainty equivalents. The
observed certainty equivalent ceig can then be written as ceig = cˆeg + ig. There
6Loss aversion, interpreted as difference between risk aversion with respect to nonmixed
and mixed lotteries, i.e. lotteries with both positive and negative outcomes, is not identifiable
in our data, as the lottery designs did not contain any mixed lotteries (Ko¨bberling and Wakker,
2005).
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may be different sources of error, such as carelessness, hurry or inattentiveness,
resulting in accidentally wrong answers (Hey and Orme, 1994). The Central
Limit Theorem supports our assumption that the errors are normally distributed
and simply add white noise.
Furthermore, we allow for three different sources of heteroskedasticity in the
error variance. First, for each lottery, subjects had to consider 20 certain out-
comes, which are equally spaced throughout the lottery’s range |x1g−x2g|. Since
the observed certainty equivalent ceig is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the
smallest certain amount preferred to the lottery and the subsequent amount on
the list, the error is proportional to the lottery range. Second, as the subjects
may be heterogeneous with respect to their previous knowledge, their atten-
tion span as well as their ability of finding the correct certainty equivalent, we
expect the error variance to differ by individual. Third, lotteries in the gain do-
main may be evaluated differently from the ones in the loss domain. Therefore,
we allow for domain-specific variance in the error term. This yields the form
σig = ξi|x1g − x2g| for the standard deviation of the error term distribution,
where ξi denotes an individual domain-specific parameter. Note that the model
allows to test for both individual-specific and domain-specific heteroskedasticity
by either imposing the restriction ξi = ξ, or by forcing all the ξi to be equal in
both decision domains. Both types of restrictions are rejected by their corre-
sponding likelihood ratio tests in all three samples with p-values close to zero.
Therefore, we control for all three types of heteroskedasticity in the estimation
procedure.
Having discussed all the necessary ingredients, we now turn to the specifica-
tion of the finite mixture regression model. The basic idea of the mixture model
is assigning an individual’s risk-taking choices to one of C types of behavior,
each characterized by a distinct vector of parameters θc = (αc, βc, γ
′
c, δ
′
c)
′7. We
7The vectors γc and δc contain the domain-specific parameters for the slope and the ele-
vation of the probability weighting functions.
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denote the proportions of these different types in the population by pic. Given
our assumptions on the distribution of the error term, the density of type c for
the i-th individual can be expressed as
f (cei,G; θc, ξi) =
G∏
g=1
1
σig
φ
(
ceig − cˆeg
σig
)
,
where φ(·) denotes the density of the standard normal distribution. Since we do
not know a priori to which group a certain individual belongs to, the propor-
tions pic are interpreted as probabilities of group membership. Therefore, each
individual density of type c has to be weighted by its respective mixing propor-
tion pic, which, of course, is unknown and has to be estimated as well. Summing
over all C components yields the individual’s contribution to the model’s likeli-
hood L. The log likelihood of the finite mixture regression model is then given
by
lnL (Ψ; ce,G) =
N∑
i=1
ln
C∑
c=1
pic f (cei,G; θc, ξi),
where the vector Ψ = (θ′1, . . . , θ
′
C , pi1, . . . , piC−1, ξ1, . . . , ξN)
′ summarizes all the
parameters of the model.
The parameters are estimated by the iterative Expectation Maximization
(EM) algorithm (Dempster, Laird, and Rubin, 1977), which provides an addi-
tional feature: In each iteration, the algorithm calculates by Bayesian updating
an individual’s posterior probability τic of belonging to group c. The final pos-
terior probabilities represent a particularly valuable result of the estimation
procedure. Not only do we obtain the probabilities of individual group mem-
bership, but we also have a method of judging the quality of classification at
our disposal. If all the τic are either close to zero or one, all the individuals are
unambiguously assigned to one specific group. The τic can be used to calculate
a summary measure of ambiguity in order to gage the extent of dubious assign-
ments. If classification has been successful, i.e. if genuinely distinct types have
been identified, we should observe a low measure of entropy.
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Various problems may be encountered when maximizing the likelihood func-
tion of a finite mixture regression model and, therefore, a customized estimation
procedure was used that can adequately deal with these problems. Details of
the estimation procedure, written in the R environment (R Development Core
Team, 2006), are discussed in Appendix A.
4 Results
In the following section we describe observed risk taking behavior before present-
ing the results of the finite mixture regressions. As the finite mixture regression
model is defined over a pre-specified number of groups, we need to assess the
correct number of groups and, therefore, discuss model selection first. Second,
we document the cleanness and robustness of individuals’ segregation to types.
Furthermore, each distinct type of individual is characterized by her estimated
behavioral parameter values, whereby we address the issue of cross-cultural
differences. We also discuss type-specific differences in observed behavior and
relate them to demographic variables. Finally, we comment on the stability of
classification with respect to model specification.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
At the level of observed data, risk taking behavior can be conveniently sum-
marized by relative risk premia RRP = (ev − ce)/|ev|, where ev denotes the
expected value of a lottery’s payoff and ce stands for its certainty equivalent.
RRP > 0 indicates risk aversion, RRP < 0 risk seeking, and RRP = 0 risk
neutrality. In the context of EUT, risk preferences are captured solely by the
curvature of the utility function, which in turn determines the sign of relative
risk premia. Hence, the sign of RRP should be independent of p, the probability
of the more extreme lottery outcome. In Figures 2 through 4, median risk pre-
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mia sorted by p show a systematic relationship between RRP and p, however:
In all three data sets subjects’ choices display a fourfold pattern, i.e. they are
risk averse for low-probability losses and high-probability gains, and they are
risk seeking for low-probability gains and high-probability losses. Therefore, at
a first glance, average behavior is adequately described by a model such as CPT
rather than EUT. As the following sections show, the median RRP s gloss over
an important feature of the data as there is substantial latent heterogeneity in
risk taking behavior.
Figure 2: Median Relative Risk Premia, Zurich 2003
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Figure 3: Median Relative Risk Premia, Zurich 2006
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Figure 4: Median Relative Risk Premia, Beijing 2005
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4.2 Model Selection
So far we have not addressed the issue whether a finite mixture regression model
is actually to be preferred over a single-component model in the first place, and
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what the number of groups C in the mixture model, often termed model size,
should be. In order to deal with these questions the researcher needs a criterion
for assessing the correct number of mixture components. The literature on
model selection in the context of mixture models is quite controversial, however,
and there is no best solution.8 For this reason, rather than relying on a single
measure, we examine several criteria with differing characteristics to get a handle
on the problem of model selection.
Obviously, the classical information criteria, the Akaike Information Crite-
rion AIC and the Bayesian Information Criterion BIC are a natural starting
point for our analysis. Unfortunately, the AIC criterion is order-inconsistent,
i.e. the probability that it is minimized at the true size of the model does
not approach unity with increasing sample size, and it tends to overfit models
(Celeux and Soromenho, 1996). The BIC, on the other hand, has been proved
to be consistent under suitable regularity conditions but may suffer from over-
or underestimating the number of mixture components (Biernacki, Celeux, and
Govaert, 2000).
Aside from these problems, both classical criteria share the principle of trad-
ing off model parsimony against goodness of fit, but do not directly measure the
ability of the mixture to provide well separated and nonoverlapping components,
which, ultimately, is the objective of estimating mixture models. Therefore,
Celeux and Soromenho (1996) propose to use the Normalized Entropy Crite-
rion NEC, which is based on the posterior probability of group membership τic.
Biernacki, Celeux, and Govaert (1999) argue that the NEC criterion appears to
be less sensitive than AIC and BIC. However, the NEC focuses solely on the
quality of classification and does not take model fit into account. Consequently,
these authors argue that NEC is not adequate with respect to the choice of the
relevant form of the mixture model.
8“The problem of identifying the number of classes is one of the issues in mixture modeling
with the least satisfactory treatment.” (Wedel (2002), p.364)
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Ideally, what the researcher would like to have at her disposal is a criterion
that delivers both an assessment of model fit, making allowance for parsimony,
and the quality of classification. Biernacki, Celeux, and Govaert (2000) therefore
suggest to modify the BIC criterion by factoring in a penalty for mean entropy.
When the mixture components are well separated, mean entropy is close to zero
and its weight in their proposed Integrated Completed Likelihood Criterion ICL
is negligible. In the one-component case there is no entropy by definition, and
therefore the ICL coincides with the BIC. While there is no theoretical justi-
fication for this approach, simulations show a superior performance compared
to other heuristic criteria, such as the NEC (Biernacki, Celeux, and Govaert,
2000), as well as compared to AIC and BIC (McLachlan and Peel, 2000).
As different criteria may come up with conflicting results concerning the
correct number of mixture components, model selection is a difficult problem.
One way of dealing with this issue is to use one’s central research question as
a guide line. Our concern here is twofold: First, given the vast heterogeneity
in individual risk taking behavior, it is doubtful whether a single-component
model is adequate. Therefore, the crucial question is whether C > 1 should be
preferred to C = 1.9 Second, considering the heated dispute about the empirical
validity of expected utility theory, another objective of our study is to find out
whether a stable group of expected utility maximizers can be reliably identified
in all three data sets. Bearing these objectives in mind, we calculated values
for four different criteria, AIC, BIC, NEC as well as ICL, and three different
model sizes, C ∈ {1, 2, 3}, presented in Table 3. According to these criteria, the
model size which minimizes the respective criterion value should be preferred.
As AIC, BIC, and therefore also ICL, are highest at C = 1 for all three
data sets, C > 1 is clearly favored over C = 1. As the NEC criterion is not
defined for C = 1, Biernacki, Celeux, and Govaert (1999) argue in favor of a
9Parameter estimates for C = 1 are presented in Appendix B.
17
Table 3: Model Selection Criteria
Zurich 03 AIC BIC NEC ICL
C = 1 -38,398 -35,815 n.a. -35,815
C = 2 -39,629 -36,997 0.0099 -36,991
C = 3 -40,504 -37,822 0.0131 -37,807
Zurich 06 AIC BIC NEC ICL
C = 1 -20,858 -19,297 n.a. -19,297
C = 2 -22,173 -20,568 0.0041 -20,566
C = 3 -22,622 -20,971 0.0049 -20,968
Beijing 05 AIC BIC NEC ICL
C = 1 -18,485 -16,529 n.a. -16,529
C = 2 -19,585 -17,585 0.0061 -17,582
C = 3 -19,965 -17,920 0.0114 -17,912
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multi-component model if there is a C > 1 with NEC(C) ≤ 1, which is the
case here. We therefore conclude that a finite mixture model is superior to
a single-component model, given the unanimous recommendation by all four
criteria.
With regard to the choice between C = 2 and C = 3, the three-group
classifications seem to be favored by all criteria but NEC. As entropy is gener-
ally extremely low for both the two-group and three-group classifications, both
model sizes seem quite sensible, however. Before we infer from these results
that we should choose C = 3, we take a closer look at the difference between
the two-group and three-group classifications.10 What is of special interest here
is whether one group remains fairly stable and the other group gets subdivided
into two new ones when model size is increased, or whether the individuals get
reshuffled to three new types. If the latter were the case, a two-group specifica-
tion would clearly be misleading. In order to answer this question we examine
relative group sizes and transition patterns of individuals’ type assignment.
Table 4 displays the estimated relative group sizes of the behavioral types
for model sizes C = 2 and C = 3. As the percentages reveal, all the Type I
groups remain stable with respect to relative group size. Moreover, with a few
exceptions, the Type I individuals remain Type I when model size is increased:
Only a total of 2% of the individuals move into or out of Type I when an
additional component is introduced into the two-group finite mixture model.11
Increasing model size results in a decomposition of the original Type II groups,
as there is still considerable heterogeneity within these groups. Thus, from the
point of view of identifying Type I individuals, the two-group classifications
10In principle, it is possible to estimate mixture models with even more components, but
problems of multimodality and potential unboundedness of the likelihood function tend to
become more severe with increasing model size.
11Across all three data sets, only 2 individuals are newly assigned to Type I and 7 individuals
leave Type I, when C is increased from 2 to 3.
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Table 4: Relative Group Sizes
Zurich 03 Type I Type II Type III
C = 2 17.1 % 82.9 %
C = 3 16.7 % 27.3 % 56.0 %
Zurich 06 Type I Type II Type III
C = 2 22.3 % 77.7 %
C = 3 22.0 % 29.8 % 48.2 %
Beijing 05 Type I Type II Type III
C = 2 20.3 % 79.7 %
C = 3 19.9 % 29.3 % 50.8 %
are informative by themselves whereas three groups render a more detailed
description of the original Type II individuals. In the following, therefore, we
will present the results both for C = 3 and C = 2.
4.3 Clean and Robust Segregation of Behavioral Types
In order to be of value to applied economics, a classification of risk taking behav-
ior should meet two conditions: First, it should be clean, i.e. all the individuals
should be clearly associated with one specific risk taking type. Second, the
classification should be robust across different experiments based on the same
design principles. Regarding the first condition, entropy criteria, based on the
posterior probabilities of group membership, can be used to evaluate the quality
of classification. One such measure is the Normalized Entropy Criterion NEC,
introduced in the previous section. If all the individuals can be clearly assigned
to one of the different behavioral groups, the posterior probabilities of group
membership τic are close to zero or one, and NEC ≈ 0. As Table 3 shows, NEC
always lies in the vicinity of zero, irrespective of the assumptions on model size
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C.
The high quality of the classifications can also be inferred directly from the
distributions of the individuals’ posterior probabilities of group membership. In
Figure 5, based on C = 2, τEUT denotes the posterior probability of belonging
to the first type, which can indeed be characterized, as we will demonstrate
below, as expected utility maximizers.12 As the distributions of τEUT show,
the individuals’ posterior probabilities of behaving consistently with EUT are
either close to one or close to zero for practically all the individuals in all three
data sets, indicating an extremely clean segregation of subjects to types. Our
result is quite remarkable as it substantiates that there are distinct types in the
population, be they Swiss or Chinese. And it also shows that the underlying
behavioral model provides a sound basis of discriminating between them.
With respect to the second criterion, robustness of classification, Figure 5
illustrates the probably most striking result of our study, namely similar distri-
butions of types across all three data sets. In all three histograms of Figure 5,
there are about four times as many individuals with τEUT close to zero, com-
pared to individuals with τEUT close to one. This finding is mirrored by the
estimates of the relative group sizes, displayed in Table 4, which shows a stable
proportion of Type I of about 20%, irrespective of model size C. Moreover, it
can be shown that the hypothesis that same distribution of types prevails in
all three data sets cannot be rejected. Similarly, when model size is increased
to C = 3, relative group sizes turn out to be of equal magnitudes in all three
data sets and are statistically indistinguishable from one another. Therefore,
classification is not only unambiguous, but also results in roughly equal mixing
proportions, demonstrating that classification is robust across experiments.
This finding leads us to the next question. Do the respective types identified
in each data set also exhibit similar patterns of behavior? This question will
12As group membership is stable, histograms of τEUT for C = 3 are qualitatively the same.
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be addressed in the following sections, dedicated to the characterization of the
endogenously defined types of behavior.
Figure 5: Distribution of Posterior Probability of Assignment to EUT,
τEUT (C = 2)
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Figure 6: Type-Specific Probability Weighting Functions, Zurich 2003
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Table 5: Classification of Behavior (C = 2)
EUT Types CPT Types
Parameters ZH 03 ZH 06 BJ 05 Pooled ZH 03 ZH 06 BJ 05 Pooled
pi 0.171 0.223 0.203 0.193 0.829 0.777 0.797 0.807
(0.026) (0.025) (0.020) (0.013)
Gains
α 0.978 0.988 1.083 0.981 1.054 0.901 0.389 0.941
(0.014) (0.018) (0.102) (0.011) (0.021) (0.026) (0.107) (0.013)
γ 0.954 0.945 0.911 0.943 0.415 0.425 0.245 0.377
(0.022) (0.020) (0.033) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.009)
δ 0.910 0.909 0.889 0.911 0.845 0.862 1.315 0.926
(0.015) (0.019) (0.052) (0.012) (0.022) (0.028) (0.074) (0.013)
Losses
β 1.007 1.013 1.023 1.015 1.107 1.122 1.144 1.139
(0.018) (0.023) (0.084) (0.013) (0.028) (0.047) (0.107) (0.019)
γ 0.871 0.953 0.949 0.950 0.417 0.451 0.309 0.397
(0.043) (0.020) (0.040) (0.023) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.009)
δ 0.967 1.049 1.066 1.072 1.025 1.059 0.937 0.991
(0.062) (0.033) (0.065) (0.026) (0.028) (0.044) (0.053) (0.016)
lnL 20,185 11,336 10,108 41,385
Parameters 371 249 315 909
Individuals 179 118 151 448
Observations 8,906 4,669 4,225 17,800
Standard errors (in parentheses) are based on the bootstrap method with 4,000 replications.
Parameters include additional estimates for ξi for domain- and individual-specific error variances.
ZH stands for Zurich, BJ for Beijing.
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Figure 7: Type-Specific Probability Weighting Functions, Zurich 2006
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Figure 8: Type-Specific Probability Weighting Functions, Beijing 2005
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4.4 Characterization of the Minority Type
Irrespective of model size, the first type of individuals encompasses about 20%
of the subjects in all three data sets, thus constituting the minority type. In
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order to characterize risk taking behavior we examine the parameter estimates
of the value functions and probability weighting functions. Table 5 displays, for
C = 2, the type-specific parameter estimates of the finite mixture regression
model and their standard errors, obtained by the bootstrap method with 4, 000
replications (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). When model size is increased to
three groups, parameter estimates, presented in Tables 9 to 12 in Appendix
C, remain unchanged for the minority type, as group membership does not
change substantially. Therefore, from the point of view of identifying this type
of individuals, model size is not a crucial issue.
Concerning probability weighting, Table 5 displays almost identical param-
eter estimates across all three data sets as well as the pooled data. Without
having imposed any restrictions on the parameters, we find that the minority
types’ probability weighting functions are roughly linear, as the parameter es-
timates for both γ and δ are close to one. Since the probability weights are
a nonlinear combination of these parameters, inference needs to be based on γ
and δ jointly. Therefore, we constructed the 95%-confidence bands for the prob-
ability weighting curves by the percentile bootstrap method. Figures 6, 7, and 8
contain the graphs of the type-specific probability weighting functions for each
decision domain. The gray solid lines correspond to the estimated curves for the
first type, referred to as “EUT type”, and the gray dashed lines delimit their
respective confidence bands. For both gains and losses, the confidence bands
for the first type in fact include the diagonal over a wide range of probabilities,
demonstrating high congruence with linear probability weighting. Where the
confidence bands do not include the diagonal, the curves still lie extremely close
to linear weighting. In sum, in all three data sets, we find the first behavioral
type to exhibit near linear probability weighting.
With respect to the valuation of monetary outcomes, the second element
of the decision model, the estimated parameters α and β also display a high
degree of conformity. As can be inferred from the bootstrapped standard er-
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rors in Table 5, the 95%-confidence intervals of each single curvature estimate
contains unity, implying that the hypothesis of linear value functions cannot be
rejected. Together with near linear probability weighting, this result justifies
regarding the first type of individuals as largely consistent with expected value
maximization, and therefore EUT.
4.5 Characterization of the Majority Types
In contrast to the EUT groups, model size makes a difference in characterizing
the majority types. In the two-group classification, average behavior of the
majority group can be interpreted as a mixture of two different subtypes. We
will present results for C = 2 first and then comment on the C = 3 results.
The majority types’ probability weighting curves for C = 2 are pictured
as black lines in Figures 6, 7, and 8. The solid lines correspond to the esti-
mated curves, the dashed lines mark the corresponding 95%-confidence bands.
For both gains and losses, all three figures show inverted S-shaped probability
weighting functions. Consequently, we label these individuals as “CPT types”.
However, CPT individuals do not display as uniform a behavior across cultures
as do the EUT individuals: Whereas the Swiss probability weighting curves in
Figures 6 and 7 are quite similar, the Chinese ones in Figure 8 differ markedly
from the Swiss. First, the Chinese probability weighting functions are gener-
ally flatter in the middle part than the Swiss curves, which indicates a lower
sensitivity towards changes in probabilities (for gains estimated γ = 0.245 for
Chinese subjects versus 0.415 and 0.425 for Swiss subjects, and for losses es-
timated γ = 0.309 versus 0.417 and 0.452; see Table 5). Second, the Swiss
probability weighting curves for gains exhibit the familiar shape, i.e. inter-
section with the diagonal at probabilities of about 0.4, whereas the Chinese
probability weighting function is much more elevated than the Swiss ones, im-
plying substantially more optimistic weighting of gain probabilities (estimated
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δ = 1.316 versus 0.845 and 0.862, respectively). Similarly, cultural differences
are evident in the estimated value function parameters over gains. Contrary to
the slightly concave or convex Swiss curvatures, the Chinese value function is
distinctly concave (estimated α = 0.387).
As already noted in the section on model selection, model fit improves with
increasing model size. When a third group is allowed for, we find that the
original CPT groups get subdivided into two different CPT types, each charac-
terized by a specific variety of nonlinear probability weighting. Estimates are
presented in Tables 9 to 12 in Appendix C. The difference between CPT I and
CPT II types manifests itself predominantly in their relative strength of opti-
mism: the elevation of the probability weighting curves, measured by δ, differ
substantially between CPT I and CPT II as the respective Figures 12 to 14 in
Appendix C show. CPT II individuals, who constitute the relative majority of
approximately 50% in all three data sets, exhibit S-shaped probability weight-
ing curves with δ in the vicinity of one. Swiss CPT I individuals, however,
are systematically less optimistic than CPT II types, whereas the Chinese CPT
I type encompasses highly optimistic individuals, explaining the prevalence of
optimism in the Chinese population. The high degree of optimism of Chinese
CPT I types manifests itself not only in the gain domain but also in the loss
domain, which does not get uncovered by the two-group classification. This ev-
idence may constitute a valuable piece of information when more disaggregate
estimates of risk taking behavior are called for. When the focus of research lies
on a parsimonious characterization of risk taking types with respect to EUT
versus CPT, two-group classifications are sufficiently informative due to the
stability of EUT group membership.
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4.6 Observed Behavior by Type
So far we have characterized the different behavioral types by their estimated
parameter values. The obvious question arises whether the discriminatory power
of the classification procedure can also be traced at the behavioral level. After
assigning the subjects to one of the two major types, EUT and CPT, based on
their posterior probability of group membership τic, the observed relative risk
premia can be broken down by type as depicted in Figure 9, exemplary for the
Chinese data set. As can be seen, median RRP of the Chinese EUT type are
close to zero, reflecting near risk neutral behavior in accordance with expected
value maximization. A similar picture can be shown to emerge for the Zurich
2003 and Zurich 2006 data sets.
When tracing behavior of the CPT types at the level of observed RRP in
Figure 9, we find a pronounced fourfold pattern of Chinese risk attitudes, with
more extreme departures from risk neutrality than the aggregate risk premia in
Figure 4. As before, a similar picture can be shown to emerge for the Zurich
2003 and Zurich 2006 data. These findings document that individuals’ type
assignment is highly congruent with observed behavioral differences.
Obviously, the type-specific median relative risk premia do not differ greatly
at p = 0.5. In decision situations when the more extreme reward materializes
with a 50% chance, the typical CPT individual will not over- or underweight
its probability significantly, and therefore her behavior will often not be dis-
tinguishable from a typical EUT type’s. This consideration can be illustrated
by means of Figure 10, which displays the departures of average CPT behavior
from EUT, measured by the type-specific differences in median normalized cer-
tainty equivalents. Each circle in Figure 10 corresponds to one specific lottery
played in any of the three experiments, encompassing a total of 59 gain and 59
loss lotteries, ordered by the probability of the more extreme lottery outcome.
At a gain probability of 25%, for instance, CPT lottery evaluations, on average,
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exceed EUT ones by up to 30% of their corresponding expected values. The
dashed lines in the graphs represent the case when median CPT behavior does
not differ from median EUT behavior. Positive values in the graphs indicate
that, on average, CPT types are relatively more risk seeking than EUT types.
The opposite holds for negative values. As the graphs show, zero differences
occur solely at the 0.5 probability level where, in some cases, average CPT be-
havior is totally indistinguishable from EUT behavior. The bulk of type-specific
differences in lottery evaluations lie in the range of about +/- 20% of expected
values, but there are also a few observations with up to +/- 300% of expected
value, where the more extreme outcomes materialize with a low probability. In
these cases, CPT types tend to overreact pronouncedly to stated probabilities.
In order to provide an overall measure we conducted two-sided Mann-Whitney
tests which indicate significant differences (at the 5% level) in the type-specific
distributions of the certainty equivalents for 75% of the lotteries.
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Figure 9: Median Relative Risk Premia by Type, Beijing 2005
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Figure 10: Differences in Median Normalized Certainty Equivalents,
Pooled
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4.7 Demographics and Group Membership
The finite mixture regression model is a powerful tool to uncover latent het-
erogeneity in behavior. Given our clean and robust classification of types, it
is an interesting question whether we can characterize the composition of the
different groups by demographic variables. In particular, can we explain who
the EUT types are? In order to answer this question we conducted two kinds of
analysis. First, we estimated a single-component model with demographic vari-
ables as covariates. This procedure uncovers systematic behavioral differences
among groups defined by observable socio-economic characteristics. Second, we
ran a regression of the posterior probability of EUT group membership τEUT
on a number of demographic variables available in all three data sets. For both
approaches we included the following variables: a gender dummy female, the
number of semesters enrolled at university semester, and a binary variable high-
income for incomes above a certain threshold. Summary statistics for these
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variables are included in Appendix D.
The estimates for the single-component model are presented in Table 14 in
Appendix D. The only variable that consistently affects behavioral parameters
across experiments is female13: Being female is associated with a substantially
lower value of γ, the slope of the probability weighting function. This finding
implies that women tend to be less sensitive to changes in probability than are
men, in line with the evidence in Fehr-Duda, de Gennaro, and Schubert (2006).
Consistent with these findings, women are also less likely to belong to the
EUT groups, as the estimates of the linear probability model in Table 6 show:
The coefficients for female are significantly negative for all three data sets.
There are no consistent effects of highincome on the probability of EUT group
membership. Neither does semester have a significant effect in all data sets.
Since the driving force of classification is individuals’ proneness to nonlinear
probability weighting, observable demographic characteristics would have to be
systematically associated with this propensity in order to have any explanatory
power for classification. In our experience, in student subject pools we gen-
erally do not find socio-economic characteristics, other than gender, that are
systematically correlated with the curvature of the probability weighting func-
tion. Other factors than demographics may be more important here, but this
question is still underresearched.
4.8 Robustness to Model Specification
The final part of our analysis concerns robustness of classification results with
respect to alternative specifications of the value function. For instance, peo-
ple may not evaluate gambles in isolation, but integrate prospective outcomes
with their wealth or consumption spending. To account for the possibility that
subjects integrate prospective outcomes with some background variable, we re-
13Note that the percentage of females is approximately 50% in all three data sets.
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Table 6: EUT Group Membership and Demographics
Zurich 03 Coefficient Std. Err.
intercept 0.131** 0.038
female -0.127** 0.030
semester 0.024** 0.005
highincome 0.027 0.039
R2 0.056
Zurich 06 Coefficient Std. Err.
intercept 0.292** 0.045
female -0.207** 0.036
semester 0.003 0.006
highincome 0.259** 0.085
R2 0.087
Beijing 05 Coefficient Std. Err.
intercept 0.212** 0.038
female -0.069* 0.031
semester 0.017* 0.008
highincome -0.090* 0.041
R2 0.020
Linear probability model with dependent variable
τEUT , C = 2. Bootstrapped standard errors based
on 4’000 replications. Bootstrapping accounts for
dependent variable being an estimated quantity.
** Significant at 1%, * significant at 5%.
highincome equals one if disposable income
per month exceeds CHF 1,500 or CHN 1,000,
respectively.
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estimated the model with the value function being defined over the sum of the
prospective lottery outcome and an additional type-specific background param-
eter k, such that v(x) = (x + k)α over gains and mutatis mutandis over losses,
i.e. v(x) = (x+ ω + k)β, where ω stands for the initial endowment.14
Extending the model, for C = 2, in such a manner yields the following in-
sights: First, as Figure 11 shows, the stability of classification is not affected
by the alternative model specification: For all three data sets, the distribution
of the posterior probability of belonging to EUT is almost unchanged when
background consumption is introduced into the model. The stability of group
assignment is also reflected in the estimated relative group sizes piEUT . Table
7 clearly shows that these values practically do not change when background
consumption k is included. Moreover, not a single subject out of 448 is assigned
to a different group, defined by τic ≥ 0.5, after allowing for integration with
background consumption. Finally, the estimated probability weighting func-
tions for both the EUT types and the CPT types remain stable as well when
background consumption is introduced into the model, as Figures 15 to 17,
presented in Appendix E, confirm. In sum, our analysis attests that the distri-
bution of types, individuals’ type affiliations, as well as the estimated probability
weighting functions are robust to inclusion of background consumption. This
robustness result represents further evidence that decision makers’ tendency to
weight probabilities nonlinearly is the driving force of classification.
Table 7: Estimated Model-Specific Proportions of EUT Types, piEUT
Consumption Zurich 03 Zurich 06 Beijing 05
k = 0 0.171 0.223 0.203
k endogenous 0.163 0.227 0.203
14Note that k is not identifiable when functions v are near linear.
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Figure 11:
Distribution of Posterior Probability of Assignment to EUT τEUT
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5 Concluding Remarks
We conducted three experiments based on the same design principles and ap-
plied a finite mixture regression model to the choice data. Our results provide
novel insights: In all three data sets the procedure renders a parsimonious char-
acterization of risk taking behavior. Across experiments, we find an equal mix
of distinct types, each characterized by a specific pattern of probability distor-
tion. Almost every single individual is identified as one specific type, rendering
segregation extremely clean. 20% of the population, by and large, adhere to lin-
ear probability weighting and behave essentially as expected value maximizers,
whereas majority preferences are more suitably represented by a model such as
prospect theory’s, which can accommodate nonlinear probability weighting. In
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each data set, the overall CPT group is composed of a smaller group of 30%,
displaying substantial departures from linear probability weighting, and a rela-
tive majority of 50%, departing less radically from linear probability weighting.
Moreover, classification is robust to an alternative model specification.
Whereas the distribution of types is the same in the Swiss and the Chi-
nese data sets, there are substantial cultural differences in CPT type behavior,
the most prominent being the existence of a pronouncedly optimistic group
of Chinese subjects who distort small probabilities much more strongly than
do the Swiss. This prevalence of Chinese optimism in lottery valuation may
explain previous findings that, on average, Chinese respondents are relatively
more risk seeking than Western ones (Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992; Hsee
and Weber, 1999). We also identify a gender difference in risk taking behavior:
Women are less likely to belong to the EUT group as they generally depart more
strongly from linear probability weighting than do men. This finding corrobo-
rates previous research (Fehr-Duda, de Gennaro, and Schubert, 2006; Harrison
and Rutstro¨m, forthcoming).
Our findings demonstrate that the finite mixture regression approach is a
powerful tool to identify and characterize the distribution of risk taking types
in the population. In this study, the individual is the unit of classification,
i.e. our objective was to assign the entirety of an individual’s choices to one
distinct type of behavior. As the low measures of entropy demonstrate, this
endeavor was successful and almost every individual got unambiguously assigned
to one endogenously defined behavioral type. Previous work by Harrison and
Rutstro¨m (forthcoming) tried to accomplish a different goal: They estimated the
probability that any one lottery choice, irrespective of the identity of the decision
maker, was consistent with EUT or CPT, respectively, and found that “each
[specification] is equally likely for [these] data” (section 4.1, second paragraph).
Such a different perspective on classification is bound to entail results markedly
divergent from ours, since behavior of EUT and CPT individuals may be quite
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similar in certain decision situations. Our results indicate, for example, that
for probabilities in the neighborhood of 0.5, CPT individuals’ behavior may be
hardly distinguishable from EUT behavior.
When we started this project we were quite confident that we would find a
considerable percentage of expected utility maximizers. What really surprised
us is the robust percentage of EUT types, even across two so different cultures
as the Swiss and Chinese. Since the subject pools in all three experiments
consisted of students, further research is needed to see whether the proportion
of near rational EUT types changes significantly in a representative sample and
whether the complexity of decision tasks greatly alters type assignment. If it can
be ascertained that near rational actors constitute a non-negligible proportion
of the population, their behavior, depending on the nature of the strategic
environment, may be decisive for aggregate outcomes. The existence of a robust
share of near rational actors suggests using a mix of preference theories for
modeling behavior rather than a single theory, which would yield systematically
biased results. In our data, prospect theory adequately describes behavior of
the majority of subjects but the parameter estimates exhibit culture- as well as
type-specific values. Researchers should take this evidence into account when
constructing, estimating, and applying models of choice under risk.
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A Estimation of the Finite Mixture Regression
Model
As it is generally the case in finite mixture models, direct maximization of the
log likelihood function
lnL (Ψ; ce,G) =
N∑
i=1
ln
C∑
c=1
pic f (cei,G; θc, ξi)
may encounter several problems, even if it is in principle feasible (for a general
treatise see for example McLachlan and Peel (2000)). First, the highly non-
linear form of the log likelihood causes the optimization algorithm to be rather
slow or even incapable of finding the maximum. Second, the likelihood of a finite
mixture model is often multimodal and therefore we have no guaranty that a
standard optimization routine will converge towards the global maximum rather
than to one of the local maxima.
However, if individual group-membership were observable and indicated by
tic ∈ {0, 1} the individual contribution to the likelihood function would be given
by
˜`(Ψi; cei,G, ti) =
C∏
c=1
[pic f (cei,G; θc, ξi)]tic
By using the above formulation and taking logarithms, the complete-data log
likelihood function
ln L˜ (Ψ; ce,G, t) =
N∑
i=1
C∑
c=1
tic [lnpic + ln f (cei,G; θc, ξi)]
would follow directly. As relative group sizes sum up to one, their maximum
likelihood estimates, pˆic = 1/N
∑N
i=1 tic, would be given analytically by the rela-
tive number of individuals in the respective group. Furthermore, the maximum
likelihood estimates of the group-specific parameters could be obtained sepa-
rately in each group by numerically maximizing the corresponding joint density
function which would simplify the optimization problem considerably.
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The EM algorithm proceeds iteratively in two steps, E and M, while it treats
the unobservable tic as missing data. In the E-step of the (k + 1)-th iteration
the expectation of the complete-data log likelihood L˜, given the actual fit of
the data Ψ(k), is computed. This yields, according to Bayes’ law, the posterior
probabilities of individual group-membership
τic
(
cei,G; Ψ(k)i
)
=
pi
(k)
c f
(
cei,G; θ(k)c , ξ(k)i
)
∑C
m=1 pi
(k)
m f
(
cei,G; θ(k)m , ξ(k)i
)
which replace the unknown indicators of individual group-membership, tic. Given
τic
(
cei,G; Ψ(k)i
)
, the complete-data log likelihood, L˜, is maximized in the fol-
lowing M-step which yields the updates of the model parameters,
pi(k+1)c =
1
N
N∑
i=1
τic
(
cei,G; Ψ(k)i
)
,
and (
θ
(k+1)
1 , . . . , θ
(k+1)
C , ξ
(k+1)
1 , . . . , ξ
(k+1)
N
)
=
arg max
θ1,...,θC ,ξ1,...,ξN
N∑
i=1
C∑
m=1
τim
(
cei,G; Ψ(k)i
)
ln f
(
cei,G; θ(k)m , ξ(k)i
)
.
As Dempster, Laird, and Rubin (1977) show, the likelihood never decreases from
one iteration to the next, i.e. L
(
Ψ(k+1); ce,G) ≥ L (Ψ(k); ce,G), which makes
the EM algorithm converge monotonically towards the nearest maximum of the
likelihood function regardless whether this maximum is global or just local.
In the Zurich 2003 data set, we therefore needed to apply a stochastic exten-
sion, the Simulated Annealing Expectation Maximization (SAEM) algorithm
proposed by Celeux, Chauveau, and Diebolt (1995), in order to overcome the
EM algorithm’s tendency to converge towards local maxima. In each iteration,
there is a non-zero probability that the SAEM algorithm leaves the current op-
timization path and starts over in a different region of the likelihood function
which results in much higher chances of finding the global maximum. But this
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robustness against multimodality of the objective function comes at the cost of
much higher computational demands.
As the EM algorithm is computationally highly demanding, even in its ba-
sic form, and tends to become tediously slow when close to convergence our
estimation routine relies on a hybrid estimation algorithm (Render and Walker,
1984): It first uses either the EM or the SAEM algorithm and takes advantage
of their robustness before it switches to the direct maximization of the log like-
lihood by the much faster BFGS algorithm. The estimation routine in this form
turned out to be efficient and robust as it reliably converged towards the same
maximum likelihood estimates regardless of the randomly chosen start values.
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B Aggregate Behavior
Table 8: Single-Component Models
Gains Losses
Parameters ZH 03 ZH 06 BJ 05 ZH 03 ZH 06 BJ 05
α/β 1.041 0.916 0.443 1.077 1.093 1.131
(0.021) (0.021) (0.116) (0.025) (0.036) (0.123)
γ 0.482 0.519 0.318 0.487 0.579 0.383
(0.010) (0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.027) (0.015)
δ 0.869 0.886 1.296 1.030 1.039 0.944
(0.020) (0.022) (0.081) (0.026) (0.033) (0.062)
lnL 19,563 10,671 9,550
Parameters 364 242 308
Individuals 179 118 151
Observations 8,906 4,669 4,225
Standard errors (in parentheses) are based on the bootstrap method with
4,000 replications. ZH stands for Zurich, BJ for Beijing.
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C Three-Group Classifications
Figure 12: Probability Weights CPT I vs. CPT II, Zurich 2003
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Figure 13: Probability Weights CPT I vs. CPT II, Zurich 2006
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Figure 14: Probability Weights CPT I vs. CPT II, Beijing 2005
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Table 9: Classification of Behavior with C = 3, Zurich 2003
Gains Losses
EUT CPT-I CPT-II EUT CPT-I CPT-II
pi 0.167 0.273 0.560
(0.016) (0.015) (0.022)
α 0.954 1.007 1.075 β 1.006 1.237 1.091
(0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.020) (0.044) (0.015)
γ 0.944 0.302 0.467 γ 0.885 0.304 0.459
(0.041) (0.031) (0.013) (0.042) (0.029) (0.015)
δ 0.930 0.622 0.944 δ 1.024 1.371 0.897
(0.020) (0.023) (0.017) (0.043) (0.075) (0.016)
lnL 20,630
Parameters 378
Individuals 179
Observations 8,906
Standard errors (in parentheses) are based on the bootstrap method
with 4,000 replications.
Parameters include estimates of ξi for domain- and individual-specific
error variances.
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Table 10: Classification of Behavior with C = 3, Zurich 2006
Gains Losses
EUT CPT-I CPT-II EUT CPT-I CPT-II
pi 0.220 0.298 0.482
(0.020) (0.025) (0.030)
α 0.990 0.884 0.908 β 1.012 1.100 1.141
(0.024) (0.042) (0.031) (0.029) (0.083) (0.049)
γ 0.946 0.362 0.465 γ 0.952 0.393 0.491
(0.084) (0.081) (0.022) (0.081) (0.078) (0.023)
δ 0.905 0.658 1.012 δ 1.054 1.460 0.878
(0.042) (0.054) (0.043) (0.074) (0.122) (0.054)
lnL 11,567
Parameters 256
Individuals 118
Observations 4,669
Standard errors (in parentheses) are based on the bootstrap method
with 4,000 replications.
Parameters include estimates of ξi for domain- and individual-specific
error variances.
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Table 11: Classification of Behavior with C = 3, Beijing 2005
Gains Losses
EUT CPT-I CPT-II EUT CPT-I CPT-II
pi 0.199 0.293 0.508
(0.017) (0.026) (0.027)
α 1.083 0.032 0.489 β 1.023 1.348 1.111
(0.098) (0.155) (0.113) (0.070) (0.149) (0.102)
γ 0.911 0.244 0.254 γ 0.948 0.263 0.332
(0.051) (0.049) (0.023) (0.053) (0.046) (0.019)
δ 0.889 2.194 1.085 δ 1.062 0.600 1.106
(0.094) (0.241) (0.113) (0.057) (0.093) (0.075)
lnL 10,304
Parameters 322
Individuals 151
Observations 4,225
Standard errors (in parentheses) are based on the bootstrap method
with 4,000 replications.
Parameters include estimates of ξi for domain- and individual-specific
error variances.
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Table 12: Classification of Behavior with C = 3, Pooled
Gains Losses
EUT CPT-I CPT-II EUT CPT-I CPT-II
pi 0.198 0.316 0.486
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
α 0.960 0.901 0.957 β 1.019 1.250 1.139
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
γ 0.915 0.309 0.451 γ 0.935 0.339 0.444
(0.032) (0.015) (0.010) (0.027) (0.013) (0.011)
δ 0.935 0.726 1.063 δ 1.055 1.230 0.878
(0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
lnL 42,105
Parameters 916
Individuals 448
Observations 17,800
Standard errors (in parentheses) are based on the bootstrap method
with 4,000 replications.
Parameters include estimates of ξi for domain- and individual-specific
error variances.
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D Demographics
Table 13: Summary Statistics for Demographic Variables
Zurich 03 Mean Std. Err.
Individuals 179
female 0.430 0.037
semester 3.676 0.159
highincome 0.162 0.028
Zurich 06 Mean Std. Err.
Individuals 118
female 0.441 0.046
semester 3.551 0.240
highincome 0.051 0.020
Beijing 05 Mean Std. Err.
Individuals 151
female 0.483 0.041
semester 2.238 0.133
highincome 0.146 0.029
highincome: equals one if disposable income
per month above is CHF 1,500 and CHN 1,000, respectively.
Thresholds chosen by distributional considerations and
relative students’ hourly wages.
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Table 14: Effects of Socio-Economic Variables on Parameters
Gains Losses
Regressors ZH 03 ZH 06 BJ 05 ZH 03 ZH 06 BJ 05
α/β
constant 1.101** 0.935** 0.538** 1.075** 1.049** 1.553**
(0.051) (0.039) (0.189) (0.061) (0.047) (0.373)
female -0.008 -0.041 -0.424 0.103 0.136 -0.347
(0.042) (0.044) (0.325) (0.069) (0.069) (0.351)
semester -0.016 0.002 0.096 -0.009 -0.006 -0.095
(0.012) (0.006) (0.091) (0.013) (0.008) (0.106)
highincome -0.024 -0.049 -0.436 0.078 0.064 -0.450
(0.059) (0.112) (0.251) (0.085) (0.126) (0.387)
γ
constant 0.434** 0.562** 0.374** 0.472** 0.746** 0.454**
(0.037) (0.057) (0.025) (0.037) (0.063) (0.035)
female -0.143** -0.186** -0.113** -0.149** -0.324** -0.112**
(0.022) (0.057) (0.031) (0.026) (0.054) (0.036)
semester 0.031** 0.023 0.001 0.019 0.011* 0.001
(0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.005) (0.015)
highincome 0.204** -0.110 -0.007 0.002 -0.051 -0.046
(0.079) (0.098) (0.034) (0.071) (0.070) (0.033)
δ
constant 0.848** 0.945** 1.295** 1.008** 0.990** 0.754**
(0.051) (0.042) (0.125) (0.068) (0.047) (0.176)
female -0.147** -0.134** 0.195 0.091 0.021 0.186
(0.041) (0.045) (0.227) (0.074) (0.065) (0.172)
semester 0.021 -0.001 -0.062 -0.001 0.008 0.038
(0.013) (0.006) (0.063) (0.014) (0.006) (0.053)
highincome -0.072 -0.064 0.214 -0.059 -0.016 0.227
(0.060) (0.123) (0.185) (0.084) (0.156) (0.238)
lnL 19,755 10,816 9,601
Parameters 382 260 326
Observations 8,906 4,669 4,225
Standard errors (in parentheses) are based on the bootstrap method with 4,000 replications.
** Significant at 1%-level; * significant at 5%-level. ZH stands for Zurich, BJ for Beijing.
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E Background Consumption
Figure 15: Probability Weights Zurich 2003, k endogenous
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Figure 16: Probability Weights Zurich 2006, k endogenous
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Figure 17: Probability Weights Beijing 2005, k endogenous
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